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TIME-VARYING MEASURES IN
FINANCIAL REGULATION
DANIEL K. TARULLO*
I
INTRODUCTION
One important lesson of the 2008 financial crisis was the inadequacy of a
prudential regulatory system oriented dominantly toward the solvency of
individual banking institutions. The contagion spread rapidly through channels
such as liquidity squeezes and fire sales of assets. This provided dramatic support
to those who had previously argued for a regulatory approach that would account
for procyclical behavior, correlated asset holdings, and the substantial
interconnections of large financial institutions. This “macroprudential”
regulation would focus on the financial system as a whole, in contrast to the
traditional “microprudential” focus on individual institutions. A
macroprudential approach would additionally address financial cycles and
vulnerabilities, rather than business cycles and macroeconomic vulnerabilities.
Still, this approach is motivated by macroeconomic concerns—most clearly the
damage to the real economy caused by financial crises, but also the potential
amplification through financial channels of any recession, no matter what its
origins.
To a considerable extent, macroprudential regulation builds on
microprudential regulation by taking account of a firm’s vulnerabilities
associated with the interaction of financial market actors. Fire sales of assets by
weak firms in need of liquidity are the classic example, insofar as all holders of
those assets bear costs—whether in the form of lower prices available to other
firms in need of liquidity or in the effect of mark-to-market reductions on the
balance sheets of firms that did not initially face a liquidity shortfall. At times,
though, there can be tension between macroprudential and microprudential
aims. A bank’s maintenance of high capital and liquidity levels during a recession
may, at least initially, keep the bank’s balance sheet strong. But that balance
sheet strength may come at the cost of withholding needed lending from
creditworthy firms and households. When many banks adopt, or are forced by
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regulators to maintain, that same strategy, the result may be credit and liquidity
squeezes across the economy.
The post-crisis commitment to macroprudential regulation was both quick
and widespread.1 A decade later there have been notable additions of
macroprudential elements to financial regulation, especially through the
enhancement of institution-specific regulation that takes account of systemic
considerations.2 Both mature and emerging market economies have tried a
number of other macroprudential policies. Still, the development of
macroprudential regulation has been less extensive than might have been
expected, especially in the United States. Of course, the officials appointed by
President Trump to head the financial regulatory agencies have been pursuing a
deregulatory agenda, so recent experience may not tell us much about the
underlying challenges of macroprudential policy. But experience prior to the
changes in agency leadership suggest that analytic, institutional, and legal
problems have also slowed the attainment of a robust macroprudential regulatory
system. The obstacles seem especially significant with respect to time-varying
macroprudential measures—that is, measures that vary depending on conditions
within the financial system.
Examination of these obstacles points us toward that hardy perennial of both
economic and legal scholarship—the rule vs. discretion problem. My aim in this
short Article is to identify briefly, in Part II, the problems encountered and then
to illustrate them with reference to specific examples in Part III. My discussion
will center on two post-crisis regulatory innovations with time-varying
characteristics: the Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) and the Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (LCR). In Part IV, I offer some tentative suggestions on how to
begin navigating the rule vs. discretion problem as it manifests itself in this area.
To be clear from the outset, though, the suggestions offered toward the end of
the Article are no more than that—a navigational aid, rather than a clear route
into port. The analytic and governance issues associated with macroprudential
policy, especially of the time-varying form, remain formidable.
1. In early 2009 the G-20 identified inclusion of a macroprudential perspective as one of the goals
for financial regulatory reform. See Press Release, Group of 20, London Summit – Leaders’ Statement ¶
15 (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0402.pdf [https://perma.cc/LGE9SFGL] (stating that goals of reform included “reshap[ing] our regulatory systems so that our authorities
are able to identify and take account of macro-prudential risks”). On the same day the Financial Stability
Forum, predecessor to the Financial Stability Board, issued a report on steps to be taken. FINANCIAL
STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ADDRESSING
PROCYCLICALITY IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Apr. 2, 2009), https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/r_0904a.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JPD-QDN3]. As early as the preceding August, even
before the most acute phase of the crisis, Chair Bernanke had used part of his speech at the annual
Jackson Hole meeting of central bankers to lay out the case for macroprudential regulation. Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Reducing Systemic Risk: Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Aug. 22, 2008), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080822a.htm [https://perma.cc/4Y3E-GJXE].
2. Perhaps the most important is the capital surcharge for banks of global systemic importance,
which was developed to reduce the chances that the failure of such an institution would produce systemic
problems.
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II
THE CHALLENGES OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
The entire premise of macroprudential policy is systemic. The “macro”
perspective does not simply make a policy more effective or efficient. It is
compelled by observation of financial system dynamics during crises and
recessionary periods. To the degree one follows Minsky in believing that financial
stress and crises are largely endogenous to finance itself, the imperative of
macroprudential policy is even clearer.3
Most policymakers and commentators describe systemic risk as having two
dimensions: the structural dimension and the time dimension. The former refers
to interconnectedness and other financial patterns that determine risk at any
given point in time. The latter refers to the increase and diminution in risk over
time. Macroprudential policies can address both kinds of risk through policies
aimed at building the resiliency of key financial actors to economic and financial
downturns and through policies that lean against the wind by trying to prevent
the build-up of risk in the first place. Specific policies may focus mostly on one of
these aims or may pursue both to some degree. Policies also vary based on
whether they are predominantly through-the-cycle (or time invariant) regulations
or whether they are time-varying. Thus a resiliency-oriented policy that requires
high capital levels at systemically important banks could be either time invariant
(a high, fixed capital requirement), or time-varying (a capital requirement that is
raised during periods when risk is increasing and lowered when risk is
diminishing), or a combination of the two.4
The challenges in developing macroprudential regulation are several. First, of
course, is the difficulty of tracing patterns of financial activity and regulatory
response through the entire financial system. While much progress has been
made in developing metrics for measuring systemic risk in the financial system,
they remain essentially untested and thus unverified as predictors. The differing
etiologies and characteristics of the limited number of relevant real-world
observations make it tricky to fix on specific indicators with a high degree of
confidence. Just as it is harder to do a general equilibrium analysis than a partial
equilibrium analysis, it is harder to take account of everything—or even

3. See Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper
No. 74, 1992), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp74.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YW3-K2VW] (explaining
that the financial instability hypothesis “does not rely upon exogenous shocks to generate business cycles
of varying severity,” but rather “that business cycles of history are compounded out of . . . the internal
dynamics of capitalist economies”).
4. Among accessible overviews of macroprudential policy are Robert C. Hockett, The
Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety and Soundness’ to Systematic ‘Financial Stability’ in
Financial Supervision, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 (2015); Turalay Kenç, Macroprudential Regulation:
History, Theory and Policy (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 86, 2016),
https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap86c.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMN5-SCCT]. For a book-length
overview, see XAVIER FREIXAS, LUC LAEVEN & JOSÉ-LUIS PEYDRÓ, SYSTEMIC RISK, CRISES, AND
MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION (2015).
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everything of arguable importance going on in the financial system—than to
focus on a single firm or financial product.
Second is the lack of feedback for macroprudential policymakers.5 Monetary
policy—the exemplary case of a macro policy—provides feedback to central
bankers in the form of changes in inflation, unemployment, growth, consumption,
investment, and a host of other indicators. The first two of these indicators are
the stated goals of monetary policy; the others are reflections of economic activity
that will affect the aggregated indicators, albeit in varying and sometimes
unpredictable ways. While the impact of monetary policy on the economy is
lagged, the interval is measured in quarters, not years. Inflation rates usually
move—or stay—high or low in something approximating linear fashion, allowing
central banks time to adjust.
With macroprudential policy, on the other hand, the aim is to avoid financial
crises or the exacerbation of a recession originating outside the financial system.
While not quite a binary environment for policymakers, the macroprudential
world is one in which the absence of crisis for ten years may not indicate success,
since one may quite suddenly come in year eleven if policy has not been
sufficiently stringent. Conversely, there is no direct way of knowing whether
macroprudential policies have been excessively stringent or misweighted over all
those years, with consequential reduction in otherwise sustainable allocations of
credit and thus an unnecessary constraint on growth. In other words, changing
economic and financial conditions provide only limited information to determine
whether the intertemporal tradeoff between credit allocation in the present and
in the future has been properly struck.
Third, and related to the preceding point, is the problem of incentives for
policymakers of all sorts—legislators, as well as central bankers and financial
regulators. When a potential harm lies in the indeterminate future, and measures
to offset that harm have immediate costs, officials directly or indirectly
accountable to electorates will often feel pressure to discount the likelihood of
the future harm and thus fix on less stringent offsetting measures. The obvious
example here is climate change, where the impulse to downplay the harm to the
future may bring catastrophic consequences. Fortunately, even the worst
financial crises will not wreak the harm that may be caused by climate change.
But in some sense the problem for macroprudential policy is even more acute.
While there may be dramatic non-linear effects of climate change to come, there
have already been many observable effects—feedback to the absence of
meaningful policies in the past. The reality of future significant harm is now
widely (though, needless to say, not universally) accepted. The financial system,
on the other hand, tends to move from looking robust to looking highly stressed
in the space of at most a year or two.

5. Here I mean feedback in the more technical economic sense. There is plenty of political
feedback from aggrieved financiers, their lobbyists, and their legislative supporters.
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A fourth, and final, challenge is the regulatory perimeter—that is, whether
policymakers have authority over a sufficient segment of total financial activity
to make their macroprudential regulatory measures effective. This, of course, is
an organizational and legal problem, not one inherent to macroprudential policy.
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Policy Committee and the agencies
represented on it together have plenary authority over most relevant actors and
activities, though there are still some jurisdictional lacunae. In the United States,
however, large swaths of financial activity lie outside the remit of any prudential
regulatory authority—a situation not remedied by the structurally-flawed
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) created after the crisis.6 This gap
means that various forms of shadow banking can escape regulation. It also raises
the prospect that macroprudential measures applied to firms within the
prudential regulatory perimeter will accelerate migration of lending out of those
firms to shadow banking entities, with resulting harm to the franchise value of
the regulated firms. While macroprudential considerations can nonetheless
justify rigorous regulation of the largest banks—whose failures alone could
trigger or worsen a crisis—it may be harder under such circumstances to justify
the impact of macroprudential measures on community and regional banks.
III
TIME-VARYING MEASURES
Conceptually, time-varying measures would seem a natural, if not necessary,
feature of macroprudential policy. An explicitly countercyclical policy would
tighten regulation in response to rapid, unsustainable increases in credit or asset
prices and relax regulation as economic conditions deteriorate. Such an approach
would require the greatest resiliency increases and dampen financial activity most
at or near the top of financial cycles, while releasing bank funds and encouraging
credit extension when financial markets have materially tightened.
Unfortunately, the impediments to fashioning a legal structure for
macroprudential regulation are even greater for time-varying measures. On the
upper reaches of the financial cycle, the four challenges just identified are, on net,
more problematic. The feedback problem may be slightly diminished in timevarying contexts, since by directing policy measures at specific rising asset prices
or credit levels, it becomes somewhat easier to evaluate whether the measures
are having success (though no less difficult to judge whether the ultimate aim of
macroprudential policy is being achieved without undue cost to current economic
performance). But the regulatory perimeter problem is undiminished. And the
analytic challenge is arguably even greater when one attempts to adjust policy in
real time. For an efficacious response, there needs to be a fairly quick evaluation
of whether fast rising levels of, for example, residential mortgage securitization,
6. See Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 CAL. L. REV.
327 (2013) (arguing that since the 2007–08 financial crisis the independent agency paradigm has been
under attack).
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agricultural land lending, or leveraged corporate loans are posing systemic risk
within a particular economic context. Similarly, the incentive structure is further
complicated for government officials operating in a specific moment, with
specific economic and political pressures being brought to bear. Finally, there is
a problem for time-varying policies that is largely irrelevant to through-the-cycle
measures: during the stressed part of the financial cycle the market may frustrate,
if not outright defeat, macroprudential policy changes.
The analytic complexities of time-varying macroprudential policy make the
formulation of rules especially difficult. At least in the present state of
knowledge, the isolation of reliable variables and metrics is a daunting task. But
reserving discretion for regulators in the absence of at least presumptively
determinative metrics introduces its own set of problems. At the risk of some
oversimplification, during the non-stress parts of financial cycles the key problem
in creating a workable legal structure for time-varying macroprudential policy is
politics, and during the stressed parts of financial cycles the key problem is the
market. The remainder of this Part develops this observation with a few
examples. To avoid confusion, I should note that for present purposes “politics”
includes institutional and internal agency considerations, as well as classic
external political pressures.
A. Time-Varying Measures in Non-Stress Periods
The view that optimal capital requirements have a time-varying feature has
an academic pedigree preceding the financial crisis,7 which in turn built on the
long-standing concern of some commentators that capital requirements were
undesirably procyclical.8 During upswings in the financial cycle, defaults are low,
collateral values have risen, and bank capital levels are consequently less
constrained by either regulatory or internally-generated capital requirements. In
downturns, defaults and increased loss provisioning erode capital levels, a
dynamic that can lead to credit squeezes even for creditworthy households and
businesses.
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress gave the banking agencies explicit
instructions to “seek to make [capital] requirements countercyclical, so that the
amount of capital required to be maintained by a [bank or holding company]
increases in times of economic expansion and decreases in times of economic

7. See Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, Cyclical Implications of the Basel-II Capital Standards,
28 ECON. PERSP. 18, 28 (2004), https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economic-perspectives/2004/
1qtr2004-part2-kashyap-stein [https://perma.cc/HPJ8-68JW] (concluding that “the Basel II approach of
having a single time-invariant risk curve is, in principle, suboptimal”). The Basel Accords—Basel I, II,
and III—are sets of international banking regulations which set minimum capital requirements of
financial institutions with the goal of minimizing credit risk. History of the Basel Committee, BIS,
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm [https://perma.cc/9SR8-5QB9].
8. See DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REGULATION 77–79, 178–82 (2008) (raising general concerns of the procyclical nature of capital
requirement and specific concerns regarding Basel I and Basel II).
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contraction, consistent with the safety and soundness of the company.”9 Even as
Dodd-Frank passed Congress, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was
working on a Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB), which became one of the
innovations in capital regulation produced by the Basel III package of changes to
internationally-agreed capital standards. A CCyB framework was implemented
in the United States as one of the post-crisis changes to capital rules.10
The CCyB can vary between 0 and 2.5%, based on semi-annual
determinations made by the banking agencies. Generally speaking, it applies in
the United States only to banks with greater than $250 billion in assets and does
not take effect for a year after an announced increase, so as to avoid abrupt
constraints on bank lending. Reductions take place more or less immediately.
When the CCyB is a positive number, it is added to the Capital Conservation
Buffer, a fixed 2.5% of risk-weighted assets that itself sits on top of the minimum
capital requirement of 4.5% of risk-weighted assets. When a bank’s common
equity ratio falls into the buffer range, its distributions of capital to shareholders
and employees (via certain kinds of bonuses) are progressively restricted.
The Basel Committee and U.S. officials explicitly characterize the CCyB as
time-varying and macroprudential.11 It is intended to increase the resiliency of
the largest banking institutions, both to reduce their potential for failure and to
increase the chances that they will be able to provide needed credit during a
serious downturn. The Basel Committee has noted that a “positive side benefit”
of the CCyB may be some lean-against-the-wind effect, if and as the buffer raises
the cost of credit during the most expansionary parts of the financial cycle.12 In
the United States, the Federal Reserve made clear that the CCyB would be raised
or lowered by reference to overall economic and financial conditions.13
There is considerable debate around the relative utility of the CCyB,
including the disadvantages of its lagged and limited coverage, and whether a
stress-testing regime that incorporated macroprudential features would be a
better vehicle for countercyclical capital regulation. For present purposes,
though, I put that debate aside in order to focus on CCyB as an illustration of the
challenges presented by time-varying macroprudential regulation. Indeed, it
offers an almost textbook case of the familiar rule vs. discretion debate,
presenting as it does the likelihood of significant shortcomings whether a rule or
a discretionary approach is chosen.
The central issue in administering the CCyB is how to decide when it should
go up or down. Congress gave the banking agencies no guidance as to how they
9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 616, 124
Stat. 1376, 1615–16 (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467A, 1844, 3907 (2012)).
10. 12 C.F.R. § 217.11(b) (2014).
11. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GUIDANCE FOR NATIONAL AUTHORITIES ON
OPERATING THE COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER 1 (2010) [hereinafter BASEL COMMITTEE
GUIDANCE]; The Federal Reserve Board’s Framework for Implementing the U.S. Basel III
Countercyclical Capital Buffer, 12 C.F.R. § 217 App. A (2014) [hereinafter Fed. Policy Statement].
12. BASEL COMMITTEE GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 1.
13. See Fed. Policy Statement, supra note 11.
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should make capital requirements countercyclical. The Basel Committee, on the
other hand, provided considerable guidance for its members’ implementation of
the CCyB.14 Based on prior work by staff economists at the Bank for
International Settlements, the Basel Committee concluded that a “credit-toGDP gap was the best performing of the range of variables considered.”15 As its
name suggests, this variable measures changes in the ratio of total private sector
credit to GDP. The gap is derived from the observed deviation of the ratio from
its trend. The Basel Committee guidance further suggested how the appropriate
size of the CCyB should vary with the size of the credit-to-GDP gap.16
While the Basel Committee guidance indicated that each national authority
should calculate the credit-to-GDP gap to “serve as a common starting reference
point for taking buffer decisions,” it also made clear that “[a]uthorities are
expected to apply judgment” in setting the buffer.17 The credit-to-GDP gap was
thus not the basis for a rule—and really not even for a presumption. It was only
a starting point for the exercise of national judgment. Yet even the effort to
establish a common starting point has not been altogether successful. In the years
following publication of the Basel III framework, a polite but vigorous debate
ensued among official sector economists over the merits of the credit-to-GDP
gap.18 In addition to the issue of whether the underlying trend in the credit-toGDP relationship was desirable and sustainable, truly technical issues such as the
proper smoothing parameter were also debated.19
The Basel Committee’s report on implementation of the CCyB indicates that
some form of a credit-to-GDP ratio is just one among many “core” indicators

14. See generally BASEL COMMITTEE GUIDANCE, supra note 11.
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id. at 13–14.
17. Id. at 2.
18. See, e.g., Mathias Drehmann & Kostas Tsatsaronis, The Credit-to-GDP Gap and Countercyclical
Capital Buffers: Questions and Answers, BIS Q. REV. 55, 55 (2014), https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/
r_qt1403g.htm [https://perma.cc/9H3B-TZNB] (assessing criticisms of the credit-to-GDP gap, rebutting
some, but emphasizing that the variable is supposed to inform rather than dictate use of CCyB); Rochelle
M. Edge & Ralf R. Meisenzahl, The Unreliability of Credit-to-GDP Ratio Gaps in Real Time: Implications
for Countercyclical Capital Buffers, INT’L J. CENT. BANKING 261 (2011); Julia Giese et al., The Credit-toGDP Gap and Complementary Indicators for Macroprudential Policy: Evidence from the UK, 19 INT’L J.
FIN. ECON. 25 (2014), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/ijfe.1489 [https://perma.cc/7RAKFPXZ] (stating that despite the accuracy of the credit-to-GDP gap in providing advance signal of past
U.K. episodes of financial distress, it may not work well in future); Timothy Grieder, Dylan Hogg &
Thibaut Duprey, Recent Evolution of Canada’s Credit-to-GDP Gap: Measurement and Interpretation,
Bank of Can. Staff Analytical Note 2017-25 (Dec. 2017), https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/san2017-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA/ 8Q-6VAF] (arguing that the credit-toGDP gap both misses and mistakenly identifies financial system vulnerabilities); Torsten Wezel,
Conceptual Issues in Calibrating the Basel III Countercyclical Capital Buffer (Int’l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. 19/86, 2019), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/05/01/ConceptualIssues-in-Calibrating-the-Basel-III-Countercyclical-Capital-Buffer-46742 [https://perma.cc/W377-394Z]
(explaining the needs for adjustment to the Basel credit-to-GDP gap to make it a robust explanatory
variable).
19. See BASEL COMMITTEE GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 2.
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specified by national authorities.20 In the United States, the banking agencies
have not specified any “core” indicators. The Federal Reserve’s CCyB regulation
says only that
[t]he Board will base its decision to adjust the countercyclical capital buffer amount
under this section on a range of macroeconomic, financial, and supervisory information
indicating an increase in systemic risk including, but not limited to, the ratio of credit to
gross domestic product, a variety of asset prices, other factors indicative of relative
credit and liquidity expansion or contraction, funding spreads, credit condition surveys,
indices based on credit default swap spreads, options implied volatility, and measures
of systemic risk.21

Administrators are often inclined to maximize their discretion, so the fact that
they have declined to adopt a rule or rule-like presumption does not itself prove
that a rule would be unworkable. More telling, perhaps, has been the practice of
the handful of jurisdictions that aggressively used the CCyB requirement.22 In
raising its CCyB four times, eventually to the maximum 2.5%, Hong Kong did
identify a positive credit gap as the key consideration.23 But Norway and Sweden
have over the last several years increased their CCyB requirement to the
20. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, IMPLEMENTATION: RANGE OF PRACTICES IN
IMPLEMENTING THE COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER POLICY 16–17 (June 2017) [hereinafter
CCyB IMPLEMENTATION]. Germany, for example, has identified the greatest number of “core”
indicators, with thirty. Id.
21. 12 C.F.R. § 217.11(b)(2)(iv) (2019). In its policy statement on the framework it will follow in
making this decision, the Federal Reserve underscored the absence of anything resembling a standard in
adding that “no single indicator can adequately capture all the vulnerabilities in the U.S. economy and
financial system.” Fed. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 27. My experience at the Federal Reserve was
that staff presentations to the Board during the semi-annual CCyB decision generally placed most
emphasis on half a dozen variables, but included discussion of notable sectoral and other developments
as well. In a recent speech on the CCyB, Vice Chair for Supervision Randal Quarles linked the Federal
Reserve’s CCyB decisions to the factors highlighted in its periodic Financial Stability Reports. In listing
these factors, he added that as “part of this process, the Board considers a number of quantitative
indicators – one of which is the credit-to-GDP . . . gap proposed in the Basel Committee guidance.”
Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Fed. Reserve, Speech on Frameworks for the
Countercyclical Capital Buffer at the Spring 2019 Meeting of the Manhattan Institute’s Shadow Open
Market Committee (Mar. 29, 2019).
22. See CCyB IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 20, at 18 (summarizing the actions of four jurisdictions
that used the CCyB in its early years). Subsequently, implementation of the CCyB portion of the
European Union’s Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) has resulted in a number of additional
impositions of positive CCyB buffer requirements. See EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD,
COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER [hereinafter ESRB CCyB Report], https://www.esrb.europa.eu/
national_policy/ccb/html/index.en.html [https://perma.cc/J9TC-JRU7] (offering a map to show CCyB
rates throughout the European Union) (last updated Oct. 16, 2019).
23. H.K. Monetary Auth., Announcement by the Monetary Authority of Applicable Jurisdictional
Countercyclical Capital Buffer Ratio for Hong Kong (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.hkma/./
gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-functions/banking-stability/ccyb/CCyB_Announcement/_180110.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RU97-MFCE]. Following the political disruption in Hong Kong in 2019, the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority (HKMA) lowered the CCyB to 2.0%. The HKMA noted that application of the
credit gap would call for a CCyB of 2.25%, but noted that the “setting of the CCyB for Hong Kong is
however not a mechanical exercise,” and explained the additional incremental of reduction by reference
to its assessment that economic conditions in Hong Kong had continued to deteriorate. H.K. Monetary
Auth., Announcement by the Monetary Authority of Applicable Jurisdictional Countercyclical Capital
Buffer Ratio for Hong Kong (Oct. 14, 2019) https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-functions/
banking-stability/ccyb/CCyB_announcement_191014.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKE6-5LKP].
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maximum 2.5% during a period in which their credit-to-GDP gaps were,
respectively, still quite negative24 and only recently passing into positive
territory.25 The latest Norwegian increase was based on rising levels of household
debt and property price increases.26 The Norges Bank did not even mention the
gap. Conversely, the Swedish financial regulator’s announcement of its latest
increase actually indicated that increases in debt levels were moderating and
property prices were largely stable.27 However, the financial regulator still raised
the CCyB because these recent trends were not pronounced enough to remove
financial stability risks.28 The actions of regulators in both countries imply that
the credit-to-GDP gap may miss developments that might threaten financial
stability or, perhaps, not reflect risks on a sufficiently timely basis.
At least in the present state of knowledge, then, an effective rule or rule-lite
approach to use of the CCyB does not seem available. But if time-varying
measures are back in the world of broad discretion, two basic issues immediately
present themselves. First is the usual set of administrative law considerations such
as the potentially drawn-out procedures that might be required before action
could be taken. More salient for the subject of this Article is the incentive
structure for decision-makers considering increases in the CCyB.
Numerous commentators have conjectured that officials will too often decline
or hesitate to exercise their time-varying authority to raise the CCyB despite the
presence of financial conditions warranting such a move.29 The absence of any
firm basis for judging whether systemic risk has been appropriately corralled may
complicate time-varying decisions more than macroprudential policy in general.
The reasons not to raise the buffer requirement will have more sway in the
circumstances of a time-varying decision at a specific moment. Even as the risks
of financial instability are increasing, risks to underlying economic growth may
be appearing on the horizon. A CCyB increase, which does not become effective

24. NORGES BANK, MONETARY POLICY REPORT WITH FINANCIAL STABILITY ASSESSMENT 47
(2019), https://static.norges-bank.no/contentassets/cda000898c914e7890fa1b545d81ace4/mpr_219.pdf?/
v=06/20/2019093243&ft=.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AZY-4GHU].
25. Decision by Finansinspektionen, FI Ref. 19-14609 (July 5, 2019), https://www.fi.se/content/
assets/a20f6352ede24bba9a9965ac5d37553e/beslut-kontracyklisk-buffert-2019kv3-eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MSP2-ZV88].
26. Press Release, Norges Bank, Advice on the Countercyclical Capital Buffer 2018 Q4 (Dec. 13,
2018), https://www.norges-bank.no/en/news-events/news-publications/Press-releases/2018/2018-12-13press-release-mcb/ [https://perma.cc/JVP6-FHJU] (reporting Norges Bank recommendation and
acceptance by Finance Ministry).
27. Decision by Finansinspektionen, supra note 25.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Kristen Forbes, Macroprudential Policy: What We’ve Learned, Don’t Know, and Need
to Do, 109 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 470, 472–73 (2019) (stating that “[a]ny macroprudential
authority influenced by the political cycle would be tempted to adopt less stringent regulations”); Michal
Kowalik, Countercyclical Capital Regulation: Should Bank Regulators Use Rules or Discretion?, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON. REV. 59, 68–69 (2011) (providing several reasons why authorities
may be reluctant to raise capital requirements); Itai Agur & Sunil Sharma, Rules, Discretion, and MacroPrudential Policy 11 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 13/65, 2013) (explaining that “the nature
of macro-prudential policy makes it more susceptible to political influence than monetary policy”).
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for a year after announcement, may begin to bite just as economic conditions are
becoming shaky. In the world of a low neutral rate of interest in which we are
likely to be living for a good while, central banks have more limited means to
counteract recessions. As a consequence, their own risk management strategies
will tend to err on the side of measures that may stave off recessions, even at the
expense of greater risk to financial stability at some indeterminate future time. If
a central bank doesn’t want to tighten financial conditions with monetary policy,
why do so with time-varying macroprudential measures? And, of course, there
are the more direct political pressures that have often been exerted, frequently
on a bipartisan basis, when government authorities discourage additional lending
for prudential reasons.30
The foregoing points are, like those of other commentators, conjectural. We
simply do not have enough experience from which to draw empirically grounded
conclusions. But that fact is itself part of the challenge with macroprudential
policy; there are never likely to be enough observations to allow a more or less
rigorous separation of the factors that influence decisions and produce financial
instability. Good faith conclusions that risks are not elevated, a desire not to
staunch lending for shorter-term macroeconomic reasons, a misunderstanding of
the purpose of the CCyB, policy commitment to deregulation of large banks, and
capture are some of the many reasons for inaction. But there do seem to be
grounds for believing that, no matter what their ideology, the structural
incentives faced by Federal Reserve officials create some bias toward underuse
of the CCyB. The interesting fact that other jurisdictions have applied the CCyB,
though generally in only mild form, is one to which I shall return in the last Part
of the Article.
B. Time-Varying Measures in Stress Periods
As stress builds, the challenge for time-varying macroprudential measures
arises less from analytic and political problems and more from the market.
Incentives of government officials become progressively, and eventually
overwhelmingly, focused on containing the stress and then combatting
macroeconomic fallout. There may be political resistance to various forms of
government assistance for financial actors associated with an impending or actual
crisis. But the most likely sources of resistance to relaxing macroprudential
requirements are regulators focused on the soundness of individual banks, such

30. See, e.g., H. Gary Pannell & Robert L. Carothers, Jr., Regulation Guidance on Concentrations in
Commercial Real Estate Lending, 11 N.C. BANKING INST. 33 (2007) (recounting the history of the
guidance, including the delays and dilution occasioned by the opposition); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
CRISIS AND RESPONSE: AN FDIC HISTORY, 2008–2013 119 (2017) https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/
crisis/crisis-complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9YP-DNRZ] (noting that overextension in commercial real
estate lending was at the heart of the failure of many banks during and after the 2008 financial crisis);
Steven Sloan, Legislators Press Agencies On Basel, CRE Guidelines, AM. BANKER, (Sept. 1, 2006),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/legislators-press-agencies-on-basel-cre-guidelines
[https://
perma.cc/5Q3N-8UM4] (detailing the resistance from both banks and members of Congress to the
proposed guidance on excessive concentrations in commercial real estate).
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as government deposit insurance agencies and the market. The understandable
institutional position of deposit insurers can be handled through
intergovernmental discussion and action (though, as demonstrated in the United
States in the last financial crisis, this process may not go smoothly). The market
is a different story.
The existence of non-localized stress in a financial system reflects both new
knowledge in the form of wider awareness of previously unrecognized asset and
firm vulnerabilities, and high anxiety about continuing ignorance of the depth
and breadth of those vulnerabilities. In such circumstances, most private financial
actors flee institutions and assets that might be affected quickly, in contrast to
non-stress periods in which more considered analysis is likely to precede a change
in position. The implicit rule of thumb is to run to safe assets like Treasuries first
and figure things out later. Most investors and other counterparties want to deal
only with firms about whose soundness there is little, if any, real doubt.
Paradoxically, the heightened sensitivity of markets to the soundness of
financial firms in periods of stress may undercut official discretionary actions
either to strengthen or to relax prudential requirements, though for distinct
reasons. As to strengthening requirements, one of the interesting conclusions
drawn from study of the global financial crisis—and, for that matter, of the
emerging market financial crisis of the 1990s—is that the crisis proceeded in
somewhat distinct stages that were separated by periods of relative calm. The
market excitement caused by events in August 2007 gave way to a period of
uneasy stability that was rocked in March 2008 by the failure of Bear Stearns,
which was in turn followed by less volatility until September, when Lehman
Brothers’ failure ushered in the most acute phase of the crisis. In retrospect, it
appears there may have been an opportunity in the fall of 2007 and, possibly, mid2008 for large financial firms to increase their capital levels while markets were
still open through public equity raises. Although the subsequent unwinding of
mortgage-backed security positions and home foreclosures would not have been
prevented, major financial institutions might have been less susceptible to loss of
both capital and market confidence once the next stage hit.
This history has suggested to some that the Federal Reserve (and,
presumably, regulators in other countries) should use such periods of calm to
force large banks, especially those with more obvious vulnerabilities, to go to
market to increase their common equity.31 Putting aside the issue of whether
existing statutory authority gives the Federal Reserve the power to do so, the
question is whether such a step could provoke a run on some banks or the system
as a whole. The concern is that the discretionary act of requiring a capital raise
would itself, in a very delicate market environment, be read as a signal of the
Federal Reserve’s view that there were real risks of insolvency for certain banks
or even a general market meltdown. This perceived signal might set off an
31. See, e.g., Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson, Jeremy C. Stein & Adi Sunderam, Strengthening
and Streamlining Bank Capital Regulation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 479, 529–30
(2017).
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immediate run, rather than stop one later. How the scenario would play out we
of course do not know. But, with officials aware of the possibility of a run and
focused on staving off a major financial upheaval, there will surely be inhibitions
on taking such action.32
The dynamic is different with respect to relaxing requirements once the
economy and the financial system seem to be bottoming. Knowing that investors
and counterparties are intensely scrutinizing them for any sign of weakness, the
executives of banks and other financial institutions will do all they can to project
the soundness of their firms. One obvious way is to keep capital and liquidity
ratios up by reducing lending, sometimes dramatically. In the fog of a financial
crisis, reported capital ratios are assumed—usually correctly—to be lagging and
thus misleadingly high. So bank executives are incented to keep their reported
ratios strong enough that even some discount will leave them looking sound.
Sitting on capital buffers and piles of very liquid assets thus seems a good strategy
for individual banks, though obviously not for the economy as a whole.
This tendency might be counteracted by forcing banks to build large enough
buffers in non-stress periods so that, even with big losses and residual uncertainty
about further losses to come, they will still appear viable. Well before the 2008
financial crisis, astute commentators advocating for countercyclical capital
regulation made this argument.33 That is one reason for using some combination
of stress tests, countercyclical capital requirements, and possibly other measures
to require at least the largest institutions to hold capital that will enhance their
chances of surviving tail events without being compromised in the eyes of the
market. If non-stress period capital requirements are made less rigorous—as has
arguably been the case over the last few years—the losses that accompany a crisis
may, at least for a time, leave some banks technically adequately capitalized but
effectively unable to intermediate new lending. In those circumstances, dialing
back capital requirements will be utterly ineffective, since banks whose position
is open to doubt will still husband every penny of capital and liquidity they can.
During the fall of 2008, the guiding principle at numerous firms was “no money
leaves the bank.” In effect, the microprudential orientation of private markets
during stress periods will override any official relaxation of macroprudential
measures. Thus, the disincentives to applying adequate macroprudential capital
buffers in non-stress periods may defeat the later effort to relax the
(inadequately) higher requirements that had prevailed in peacetime.
The potential for markets to undermine time-varying macroprudential
regulation is also illustrated by the liquidity requirements put in place following
32. It was also notable that the U.S. Treasury insisted on injecting capital into all systemically
important banks in late 2008, even those that might not have needed it to survive. This step was in part
intended to avoid singling out any banks as especially vulnerable. Officials could also resort to quiet
persuasion, though that course runs the dual risks of becoming public and nonetheless being ineffective.
Once it is clear that the financial system is in crisis, and that specific banks are under siege by markets,
there will obviously be less weight attached to official efforts to increase bank capital levels.
33. See generally Kashyap & Stein, supra note 7 (advocating for forcing banks to build large buffers
in non-stress periods).

BOOK PROOF - TARULLO (DO NOT DELETE)

14

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

3/1/2020 10:50 PM

[Vol. 83:1

the financial crisis. Given that funding runs and liquidity squeezes were defining
characteristics of the financial system in 2008, it was necessary for regulators to
break new ground in devising quantitative liquidity rules to complement capital
regulations. To date, only one of the post-crisis rules has been implemented—the
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The LCR is not principally a macroprudential
time-varying rule. But, as will be explained shortly, regulators likely want it to
fulfill a macroprudential purpose through a time-varying feature. The problem,
again, is that markets may not go along with a regulatory relaxation of the
requirement during stress periods.
The LCR obliges large banks to maintain enough High Quality Liquid Assets
(HQLA) so that they could essentially self-fund for thirty days during a stress
period. The regulation assigns liquidity weights to a bank’s assets, reflecting
regulatory judgment of the fraction of the nominal value of the asset that could
be obtained through sales in a stress period. The bank’s HQLA must exceed the
difference between the bank’s expected outflows and inflows of cash during that
same thirty-day period. So, for example, Treasuries are assumed to be completely
liquid, and thus available to be sold to obtain market funding, while long-term
loans are assumed to be effectively illiquid within the thirty-day timeframe and
do not contribute at all to the HQLA stock. Outflow and inflow rates are assigned
to the bank’s assets and liabilities, as applicable.
There are more details, of course—many more, actually. But the core idea is
that requiring large banks to have less fragile funding structures will make them
less vulnerable to the kinds of shocks that brought down Bear Stearns and
Lehman Brothers in 2008. Moreover, even if a bank does head towards
insolvency, its demise will not so quickly occur through a massive run by shortterm funding providers. As a result, authorities would have more time to decide
what to do about the bank (placing it into resolution, arranging a sale, and so
forth) than the weekend they had as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers failed.
There is much that can be debated about the merits in normal times of postcrisis liquidity regulation, but this is not the place for such a discussion. The issue
with the LCR relevant here is what happens in conditions of significant financial
stress. The LCR is not time-varying in the way that countercyclical capital
requirements are. That is, the requirement that HQLA be 100% or more of net
expected funding needs for a thirty-day period does not increase in periods of
ample liquidity and does not, at least in any determinate way, decline under
stress. But the terms of the LCR reflect some regulatory uncertainty as to
whether banks should remain above the minimum ratio in the latter
circumstance.
As negotiated internationally in the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, the LCR specifies that “[d]uring a period of financial stress,
however, banks may use their stock of HQLA, thereby falling below 100%.”34 In
34. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO
LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS 4 (2013), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C7DF-S4UG].
AND
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such an event, “[s]upervisors will subsequently assess this situation and will adjust
their response flexibly according to the circumstances.”35 This response is to be
formulated with reference to a lengthy set of factors that may vary depending on
whether the bank faces idiosyncratic or systemic stress.36
The version of the LCR implemented in the United States does not track the
Basel Committee language that gives banks leave to use HQLA during “a period
of financial stress.” The U.S. regulation simply states that a bank subject to the
LCR must immediately report to its regulator any occurrence of its LCR falling
below 100%.37 If it stays below 100% for three consecutive business days, the firm
is then obliged to present “a plan for achieving compliance with the minimum
liquidity requirement.”38 While this U.S. regulation may seem a significant
departure from the international standard, it actually reflects little disagreement
with the intuition behind the Basel Committee provision. U.S. regulators were
concerned that the international LCR might be read as making the existence of
a “period of financial stress” a matter for the judgment of the bank itself. But
they shared the view that some relaxation may be desirable. The U.S.
requirement of reporting a shortfall has no immediate consequences other than,
possibly, producing a plan to return to compliance. In the Federal Register notice
accompanying the final rule, the U.S. banking agencies reaffirmed an earlier
stated “principle that a covered company’s HQLA amount is expected to be
available for use to address liquidity needs in a time of stress.”39 The agencies
characterized this approach of reporting shortfalls without immediate
consequences as giving them “the appropriate amount of supervisory
flexibility.”40
The reason for the de facto time-varying character of the LCR is not hard to
fathom. The purpose of liquidity regulation is to counteract the profitmaximizing incentive to “underhoard” liquidity in normal times, when it is
readily available, by directing more funding into higher-yielding (and thus,
generally, less liquid) investments.41 The LCR is premised on a potentially quite
bad outcome should stress hit, though the projected impact on a firm’s funding is
entirely plausible in light of the Lehman Brothers experience and its aftermath.
But certainly in the earlier stages of a stress period most firms will not be subject
to runs. Funding will undoubtedly tighten for many, though banks regarded as
especially strong might experience an inflow of funding as investors run from

35. Id.
36. Id. at 4–5.
37. 12 C.F.R. § 249.40(a) (2014).
38. Id. § 249.40(b)(2).
39. Liquidity Coverage Ratio, Liquidity Risk Management Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 61440, 61517
(Oct. 10, 2014).
40. Id.
41. See Jean Tirole, Illiquidity and All Its Friends, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 287, 296 (2011)
(“Underhoarding may result from a form of asset substitution, sacrificing insurance for size. The
institution may dispose of its liquid assets in order to expand the scale of its illiquid investments. It
thereby obtains less insurance, but it still receives some.”).
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riskier assets. But if all banks try to project strength or guard against the very
worst that might later happen by overhoarding their liquidity, then systemic stress
may increase. More and more firms—non-financial as well as financial—will face
cash shortages as their usual sources of liquidity dry up. This possibility is a good
example of how a purely microprudential regulatory perspective may be at odds
with a macroprudential perspective. The courses of action that look best for each
bank considered individually may be disastrous for the system as a whole and
thus, eventually, for those very banks.
Once stress is present, regulators are in an awkward position. While they may
well want banks to fall below a 100% LCR in order to continue supplying
liquidity to creditworthy customers, the signaling effects of any move in this
direction could be counterproductive. Ironically, this may be especially true
during the early stages of financial market tightening, the very time at which
measures to keep liquidity flowing might be most efficacious in slowing the
contraction process. A public statement by the Federal Reserve officially relaxing
LCR requirements because of growing stress conditions would almost surely
cause some degree of market turbulence. This possibility helps explain why the
Basel Committee LCR appears to leave the determination of stress to the banks
and why the U.S. version is so vague on the issue of consequences for falling
below 100%.
Quite apart from regulatory requirements and guidance, there will be
enormous pressure on banks during stress periods to hoard their liquidity, from
both internal and external sources. This phenomenon was readily apparent
during 2008 and the early part of 2009. Internally, tail scenarios of frozen
markets—which in normal times seem far-fetched—will be front and center in
discussions among senior management. Externally, investors and market
analysts—not to mention regulators—will be anxiously seeking information on
each bank’s capital and liquidity positions.
The question is whether a reasonably rigorous liquidity standard established
and maintained in non-stress times could make the liquidity situation worse when
stress hits. There is some reason to believe the answer may be yes. As already
noted, not all banks will experience funding challenges, and even those that do
will experience them with considerably varying intensity. While the LCR was
obviously not in place in the pre-crisis period, and it would be difficult
retrospectively to calculate banks’ positions with any precision, it seems very
likely that banks that were regarded as some of the strongest were running well
below the 100% level. Precisely because they were not thought especially
vulnerable by market actors, they continued to see inflows of funding. While few
banks were taking new risks in their lending decisions, especially from clients
with which they did not have well-established relationships, those that were in
stronger positions continued to provide liquidity in the narrowed range of less
risky lending. They also provided liquidity to existing clients under the standing
lines of credit that were activated by many non-financial firms. The danger is that
even stronger banks would hesitate to do the same with the LCR in place.
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It is important not to overstate the risk here. It may be that the LCR will have
changed liquidity practices enough that the squeeze on both banks and customers
will be less acute in a future stress period. Or it may be that banks will be
reassured by informal supervisory communications to the effect that running
somewhere below 100% for a period of time is consistent with sound practice
under the circumstances. But there is also a chance that the existence of a clear
ex ante regulatory requirement will be regarded by investors and analysts as a
convenient shorthand for a firm’s strength, and that banks—no matter how
strong, at least relatively speaking—will do all they can to maintain themselves
above that level. Indeed, some bank executives have suggested to me in private
conversations (in my post-Federal Reserve academic capacity) that they would
be concerned about anything but a trivial decline in their LCR, even if it
remained above 100% (for example, from 115% to 105%). If this is the case, then
quiet signals from regulators that LCRs below 100% are acceptable may have
little practical effect.
The requirement for regular public reporting of LCR levels, as part of the
post-crisis effort to provide more information on banks to markets, may
exacerbate whatever risk does exist. Banking interests filed comment letters to
this effect during the rule-making process on the LCR.42 While it is usually
advisable to discount somewhat industry arguments lodged against a proposed
regulation, this one rang true at the time it was made and continues to resonate
with anyone whose job it was to watch closely what banks were doing, and what
they were worried about, in the 2008 to 2009 period. Most bankers have made
clear that they are not quarreling with the LCR, at least in its main features, but
with public disclosure requirements. However, to the degree that investors and
analysts are focused on the LCR as an indicator of bank resiliency, it is not clear
that eliminating public reporting would make much of a difference. While public
reporting is required only once a quarter, everyone knows that daily reporting to
regulators is required for the largest banks. So the chief financial officers of banks
can expect demands for more frequent public disclosure during stress periods.
The banking agencies might forbid disclosure. Yet that might make things even
worse, as outside actors made their own—likely inaccurate and overly
pessimistic—estimates of banks’ LCRs based on inference from publicly
available information.
Thus the LCR may present an interesting variant on the commonplace
observation that markets may displace regulators as the source of binding
constraint on banks during stress periods. Here, in a kind of mutation of
Goodhart’s Law,43 the creation of a legal requirement using a particular metric
changes its utility not because banks look for ways around it, but because markets

42. 79 Fed. Reg. at 61517.
43. Goodhart’s Law holds that when a metric becomes a target it stops being as reliable a metric.
In more usual cases Goodhart’s Law operates as financial actors anticipate the impact of a financial
regulatory metric and find ways to avoid crossing some regulatory threshold while still effectively
carrying on the practice that gave rise to the regulation.
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and investors will effectively “enforce” it during stress, no matter what regulators
mindful of macroprudential risks may say.
IV
MOVING FORWARD
To sum up: Incorporating a macroprudential component into financial
regulation is central to achieving financial stability goals. Time-varying
macroprudential regulation is, almost by definition, most congruent with
countercyclical and financial stability policy aims. Unfortunately, the analytic,
institutional, and market challenges in effectively implementing time-varying
macroprudential measures are greater than the already significant challenges
associated with through-the-cycle measures.
Confronted with this predicament, we might simply eschew time-varying
measures. In one sense, that is not an unreasonable course of action. It would
have the added virtue of allowing a full discussion, involving the public as well as
government officials, of the merits of proposed through-the-cycle measures. But
it would place a substantial burden on those time-invariant policies (or, more
controversially, on the venerable time-varying instrument of monetary policy).
Even in a prolonged period of low real and nominal interest rates, in which
financial stability risks associated with plentiful credit could remain fairly
elevated, officials may be reluctant to set time invariant restrictions high enough
to create buffers that would withstand all losses associated with a tail event. The
cost to normal time economic activity would be regarded as too high.
So there may be good reason to continue looking for workable time-varying
policies. Here both economics and law professors should find themselves on at
least somewhat familiar ground, insofar as bridging rules vs. discretion impasses
is a recurring policy problem. In the absence of satisfactory metrics for more or
less hard rules, the issue will be how to offset the disadvantages associated with
discretion. As the preceding discussion has shown, the disadvantages are quite
distinct in different contexts. In non-stress times, the incentives of regulators may
disincline them to increase capital requirements or to use other instruments such
as increasing minimum margin requirements for securities financing transactions.
During periods of rising stress, on the other hand, an instruction to increase
capital or liquidity or margins directed to one or more banks, or to markets
generally, might be read as a signal of official alarm. The result may be a run.
Conversely, once the system is obviously under considerable stress or already in
the throes of a recession, a discretionary move to relax prudential requirements
may be de facto countermanded by banks and markets.
As the example of the LCR suggests, the last of these problems could arise
even if a rule-based measure were in place. It may be that changes in disclosure
requirements or practices could ameliorate this problem but, as mentioned
earlier, maybe not. This issue of market-induced procyclicality during the down
periods of the financial cycle remains a significant challenge, with no great
solutions in sight. This is especially true in the area of liquidity, where changes in
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a bank’s position can happen very quickly and thus the room for error is
considerably narrower.
With respect to the disadvantages of discretion for appropriate tightening of
prudential requirements, things may be a little more promising. The goal in these
instances is to enlist some external influence to offset those disadvantages. One
possibility is suggested by European Union (EU) practice on countercyclical
capital buffers. Although the more financially important Member States have
required only small CCyBs,44 by 2020 more than half of all EU countries will have
put some CCyB buffer into effect.45 It may be that the transnational character of
the EU’s CCyB, coupled with peer review within the European Systemic Risk
Board (ESRB), has at least some influence on Member States’ authorities with
responsibility for activating the CCyB. The other Member States and the ESRB
itself are presumably more focused on EU-wide financial stability and less
susceptible to local pressures.
Whatever the validity of this supposition in the European context, a
comparable external governance device is not an option in the United States. It’s
hard to see what other government actors would have both the stature and the
incentive to prod the Federal Reserve into activating the buffer. Indeed, as part
of an Administration that will always be interested in retaining the Presidency
for its party, the Secretary of the Treasury—chair of the FSOC—will if anything
have an even greater inclination to favor near-term additional growth relative to
protecting the financial system against problems that may be years in the future.46
A more promising, though necessarily incomplete, option would be to use a
rule approach to activate a modest macroprudential measure, while leaving
discretion within some legislatively established bounds to strengthen the ruledetermined measure. The idea is to force at least some countercyclical action,
even against a backdrop of admitted uncertainty as to precisely how much
additional systemic risk is being created. In the CCyB context, for example, one
would select some metric—or, conceivably, combination of metrics—that is
thought to be best correlated with systemic risk and establish a threshold level of
that metric, above which a modest CCyB would automatically apply—perhaps
0.25%. Higher thresholds might also be established, the crossing of which would
44. The United Kingdom has imposed a one percent CCyB, but in doing so it has departed
somewhat from the original concept of the CCyB. The Bank of England has decided that the CCyB
should stand at one percent in normal times, so that it could be lowered if conditions deteriorate. While
this is a fully coherent concept, it in effect is a substitute for higher fixed capital requirements in normal
times. As noted in the text, if capital levels are not high enough going into a crisis or serious recession,
the supposed ability to reduce capital requirements may be ineffectual.
45. CCyB rates for all EU Member States are reported monthly on the website of the European
Systemic Risk Board. ESRB CCyB Report, supra note 22.
46. As many commentators have noted, the structure of the Financial Policy Committee (FPC)
within the Bank of England presents an interesting institutional approach to macroprudential policy. The
FPC is chaired by the Governor of the Bank of England, but has membership from both government
agencies and outside, “independent” members. The Treasury has non-voting participation. While the
FPC has taken some notable actions, it does not yet have enough of a track record to determine if it can
avoid the structural incentives suggested earlier.
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bring incremental increases in the CCyB. Along the way, officials would be free
to use the discretion they have now to increase the CCyB consistent with
statutory authority and implementing regulations.47
Use of a rule of modest ambition might also help in buttressing resiliency
while financial stress is rising, but before it reaches an acute stage. One idea that
has been discussed informally among some policy observers is to establish a rule
that would automatically suspend capital distributions by large banks if their
aggregate capital ratio falls below a threshold specified ex ante. All large banks
would be required to suspend capital distributions, regardless of each firm’s own
capital ratios. By applying this prohibition to all large firms in conformity with a
rule established well in advance, a triggering of the rule by a drop in aggregate
capital levels would obviously not signal any new information on the views of
macroprudential authorities such as central banks. The thought of those who
have suggested such a rule is that it would avoid—or at least substantially
reduce—the risk of a run that might be occasioned by a discretionary regulatory
order affecting capital, whether directed at all or fewer than all firms.
It goes without saying that these examples would not solve the policy dilemma
I have described. With respect to the CCyB, there would doubtless be some false
positives with any metric—whether the Basel Committee’s favored credit-toGDP gap, or a specified absolute increase in credit over some number of quarters,
or any other possibility. And the disincentives to discretionary use of the CCyB
would not have been removed. The notional rule suspending capital distributions
could create perverse incentives for banks. As the aggregate capital ratio
approached the threshold whose breach would trigger suspension, they might
increase capital distributions to beat the clock, as it were. And the rule would not
respond to the problem of banks that needed to build capital, rather than just
stop distributing it to shareholders.
Obviously, modest rules of this sort would need to be well-fashioned to
anticipate and minimize undesirable effects. But if the alternative is a situation
that is structurally biased toward inaction, the old maxim about not letting the
perfect be the enemy of the good—or at least the pretty good—would seem to
apply. Going forward, policy commentators and policymakers will need to
evaluate the best options that are feasible under current analytic and institutional
limitations. Hopefully they will also develop some new options that might better
manage the intertemporal tradeoffs that must be made in an environment of
substantial uncertainty.

47. Sometimes policy observers raise the possibility of using the kind of framework of constrained
discretion that effectively governs monetary policy in the United States and many other countries. This
doesn’t seem like a promising route, insofar as the problem in monetary policy that constrained discretion
purports to address is a time consistency problem—the central bank will lower rates for a near term
economic boost while promising to take away the punchbowl when inflation is headed significantly above
target, but markets doubt the central bank will do so at that later date. Here the problem is that the
officials in whom discretion has been lodged decline to act in the first place. Moreover, the observable
target and institutional credibility that are fundamental to that strategy are, as a practical matter,
unavailable for macroprudential policy.

